David Brook’s Magical Thinking

Via IOZ, I see that David Brooks has penned a column singing praises of the rise of “spiritualism” in neuroscience. I have long been of the opinion that the next big battle between the scientific worldview and received religious tradition would take place on this front, and Brooks seems to agree with me. He’s on the opposing side though, and we see him extrude the standard mystical gibberish of those of his persuasion. Like this for instance:

Over the past several years, the momentum has shifted away from hard-core materialism. The brain seems less like a cold machine. It does not operate like a computer. Instead, meaning, belief and consciousness seem to emerge mysteriously from idiosyncratic networks of neural firings. Those squishy things called emotions play a gigantic role in all forms of thinking. Love is vital to brain development.

That’s classic magical thinking. We hear from Brooks that the brain seems less like “a cold machine” and that it doesn’t “work like a computer” (an odd implication, since just about every consumer level PC requires cooling systems to prevent it from overheating). Instead, we hear about some vague, quasi-mystical series of events that somehow renders unto the brain properties that distinguish it from mundane machines. Top-down thinking comes so naturally to us that peripheral and ambient effects among distributed interacting agents look magical, but there is no compelling reason to actually assent to such a belief. It is what Daniel Dennett calls an “intuition pump”, one which confers an intuitive misunderstanding. Distributed and parallel processing are certainly not alien to computer scientists, especially those who work in graphics. There is nothing inherently mysterious about how triangles, polyhedra, lighting, etc. arise from stream processors on a GPU, and there is no reason to assume, even in the absence of a unified scientific explanation of such, that a similar process among neural networks is magical.

4 Responses to “David Brook’s Magical Thinking”

  1. Blake Stacey Says:

    Brooks also commits a classic example of the fallacy of composition, as I mentioned at James Hrynyshyn’s place. This is what Brooks says about genetics and human behavior:

    Genes are not merely selfish, it appears. Instead, people seem to have deep instincts for fairness, empathy and attachment.

    The fuckwittery, it burns. I suppose Richard Dawkins should be pleased that people extend The Selfish Gene the same compliment they do to the Bible, i.e., tipping their hat in its direction without reading it. As has been explained countless times, the whole point of kin selection is to explain how social phenomena like cooperation and self-sacrifice can emerge from genetic replicators which are “selfish” in a narrow, behavioristic sense. To assume that because genetic sequences are “selfish” in this way implies that organisms are also selfish is just like assuming the purpose of a car is to light cigarettes. Indeed, the study of such phenomena begins with the observation that living things exhibit these behaviors (cooperation, reproductive restraint, even self-sacrifice); with the observations in hand, we then seek explanations, but those explanations, couched in the language of genetics, do not obviate the original data any more than the discovery that atoms are mostly empty space obviates the pain I feel when I slam my head into my desk, repeatedly, upon reading the latest iteration of this pseudo-intellectual canard.

    One would hope this point would eventually sink in: as Russell Blackford observed, the book is not called The Selfishness Gene. Yet it has been continually evoked: the names of Midgley and Roughgarden spring to mind, and now we can add Brooks to the list.

    I really do need to write that book. Maybe I can make it my November writing project: The Next Creationism — drum roll please!

  2. Tyler DiPietro Says:

    “To assume that because genetic sequences are “selfish” in this way implies that organisms are also selfish is just like assuming the purpose of a car is to light cigarettes.”

    Aside from Dennett’s critique of “qualia”, I’d have that Dawkins’ gene-selectionism is probably the most often misconstrued idea in the science world. Everytime I hear someone repeat the “OMG DENNETT SAYS CONSIOUSNESS DOESN’T EXIST LOL WHAT A RE-RE!!!1″ canard, I typically decide that value of continuing to read/listen to the person expounding it approaches zero.

  3. Blake Stacey Says:

    Splendid Elles, a young woman who volunteers at the Denver Museum of Nature and Science (and who just recently turned 15), said this:

    I should have learned something from The Selfish Gene… be careful with your titles because far too many people will read things by title only.

    I wish I had figured that out when I was fifteen.

    But yes, misconstruing kin selection is a pretty sure sign that one can tune out a speaker without missing anything important. Accusations of “reductionism” are also good, while using “scientism” as an insult is even better.

  4. windy Says:

    To assume that because genetic sequences are “selfish” in this way implies that organisms are also selfish is just like assuming the purpose of a car is to light cigarettes.

    IMO, it’s more like assuming that cars should only be capable of spinning in place, since that’s what the rotors and axes and wheels do.

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